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The paper evaluates the effects of privatization in 
the post-communist economies and China. In post-
communist economies privatization to foreign owners 
results in a rapid improvement in performance of firms, 
while performance effects of privatization to domestic 
owners are less impressive and vary across regions, 
coinciding with differences in policies and institutional 
development. In China relatively more estimates suggest 
that privatization to domestic owners improves the level 
of performance. Concentrated private ownership has a 
stronger positive effect on performance than dispersed 
ownership in the post-communist economies, but foreign 
joint ventures rather than wholly owned foreign firms 
have a positive effect in China. Worker or collective 
ownership does not have a negative effect. In the post-
communist economies new firms are equally or more 
efficient than firms privatized to domestic owners, and 
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foreign start-ups are more efficient than domestic ones. 
Privatization is not associated with lower employment. 
When accompanied by complementary reforms, 
privatization has a positive effect on economic growth. 
Three factors appear to drive the more positive effect of 
privatization to foreign than domestic owners. Domestic 
managers have more limited skills and access to world 
markets, domestically privatized firms have been more 
subject to tunneling and in some countries new large 
shareholders artificially decreased performance. The 
important policy implication is that privatization per se 
does not guarantee improved performance, at least not 
in the short- to medium-run. Type of private ownership, 
corporate governance, access to know-how and markets, 
and the legal and institutional system matter for firm 
performance.  
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This paper is motivated by the ongoing debate among economists and policy makers 
about the efficiency and other economic effects of privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Our goal is to evaluate what we have learned to date about the effects 
of privatization from the experiences during the last 15-20 years in the post-communist 
(transition) economies and, where relevant, China.  
The transition economies – economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that replaced most of the former Soviet 
Union -- provide a useful laboratory, having experienced major changes in the values of 
many relevant variables as they changed their economic system. Unlike most other 
developing countries and until recently also China, the transition economies for instance 
did not merely privatize a number of key state-owned firms or strive to improve the 
functioning of their legal and institutional framework. As may be seen from Table 1, they 
carried out a major transformation that made the share of private sector in GDP increase 
from extremely low levels to between 60% and 90% (see EBRD, 2007) and they 
instituted from scratch a market-oriented legal and institutional system. The transition 
economies therefore share with many other developing countries numerous 
characteristics associated with “weak” institutions, such as poorly conceived and/or 
ineffectively enforced property rights and insufficiently developed capital markets (see 
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, 2001), but they have carried 
much larger privatization programs than have been observed in other developing 
countries and until very recently also in China. One can hence obtain valuable insights 
about the impact of privatization by focusing on the large literature dealing with the 
transition. It is appropriate to undertake a study of this type now because it has been 
nearly twenty years since the start of transition so work has emerged based on datasets of 
sufficient size, length and quality to allow the use of more sophisticated methods and to 
address more robustly issues of causality. 
There has already been one major attempt to survey this literature, by Simeon 
Djankov and Peter Murrell (henceforth D-M) in 2002. D-M applied a meta-analysis to the 
findings from a large number of diverse early studies of the transition economies (but not 
China), combining – controversially - various indicators of performance into one 
  1composite measure of restructuring. The early literature focused on the impact on 
company performance of different types of mainly domestic owners – insiders, outsiders, 
investment funds – and was based largely on country-specific survey datasets that were 
frequently quite small and not necessarily representative. It did not examine in a major 
way the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) as this remained relatively low until 
the mid-1990s in CEE (except for Hungary and the Czech Republic) and until the new 
millennium in the CIS (see Klaus Meyer, 1998). 
D-M concluded that privatization to outside owners resulted in 50 percent more 
restructuring than privatization to insiders (current managers or workers). Privatization to 
workers had no effect in CEE and a negative effect in the CIS. Investment funds, foreign 
ownership and other block-holders were found to produce more than ten times as much 
restructuring as diffuse individual ownership. Hardening of budgets constraints (i.e. 
curtailing firms’ access to formal or informal state subsidies) was also found to have a 
positive effect on restructuring. Among other factors, import competition had a positive 
effect on performance in CEE, but a negative effect in CIS. Overall, D-M noted that the 
impact of privatization on company performance was typically positive and statistically 
significant in CEE, but statistically insignificant in CIS. They suggested that this could be 
explained by the more widespread occurrence of insider ownership after privatization and 
a weaker institutional environment leading to less effective governance by outside 
owners in the CIS countries.
1 Finally, D-M also pointed out that about one-half of the 
studies they surveyed did not take into account the endogeneity and selection issues 
associated with changing ownership and firm performance, and they urged future 
research to tackle this issue.
2 
The present study highlights several significant shifts of emphasis in the literature in 
recent years. Firstly as ownership structures have evolved, research interest has shifted 
                                                 
1 This was also argued in a short survey by Sergei Guriev and William Megginson (2006) which related the 
mixed results on the impact of privatization in transition economies to the slow progress in microeconomic 
and legal reform, especially in CIS countries. 
2 D-M’s arguments were developed in Megginson (2005). He concluded that “mass” privatization often led 
to disappointing outcomes, perhaps because it was frequently associated with insider ownership. Indeed, 
despite their massive privatization programs, because of their relatively low levels of development and the 
widespread use of “voucher privatization”, transition economies only generated 5% of the total global 
privatization proceeds between 1990 and 2000.   
 
  2from comparing categories of domestic owners (e.g., insider versus outsider) to domestic 
versus foreign ownership, the performance of privatized versus de novo enterprises and 
with the impact of concentrated versus dispersed ownership. Researchers have also 
increasingly noted that policies and institutional development have diverged between the 
CEE and CIS countries, with the former increasingly adopting European Union (EU) 
rules and joining the EU, and the latter proceeding slower in introducing a market 
friendly legal and institutional system. China also began from the mid-1990s to privatize 
large former state owned firms. Moreover, unlike D-M who had to combine all available 
performance measures together in their meta-analysis, we are able to distinguish 
separately the impact of privatization on efficiency (total factor productivity – TFP), 
profitability, revenues, and other indicators. Thirdly, an important aspect of our approach 
is to distinguish between studies on the basis of their econometric methodology in order 
to focus attention on more credible results. As might be expected given the changes in 
emphasis and methodology, and by including a comparison with China, our conclusions 
are richer and more nuanced, as well as more robust, than those available to D-M. 
Commencing with the macro studies, we find that the results suggest that 
privatization, especially when accompanied by complementary reforms, may have a 
positive effect on the level of aggregate output or economic growth. However, one of the 
most widely debated issues of transition (e.g., János Kornai, 2001), namely the effect on 
aggregate output and growth of rapid privatization (frequently accompanied by dispersed 
ownership) versus slower privatization (often with more concentrated ownership) 
remains unresolved. 
As to the impact of privatization on the level of TFP, we find that in CEE the overall 
effect is mostly positive during both the early and later transition periods, but that the 
effect of privatization to domestic owners is quantitatively much smaller than that to 
foreign owners, and that it is greater in the later than earlier transition period. In CIS, 
privatization to foreign owners yields a positive or insignificant effect while privatization 
to domestic owners generates a negative or insignificant effect. In most instances, the 
estimated economic effect is smaller in the CIS than CEE. Overall, the TFP effect of 
privatization to domestic owners is weaker than that to foreign owners, takes longer to 
take a hold, and in the CIS it has been outright negative or insignificant. There are as yet 
  3no TFP studies using data from China which employ robust methodologies and perhaps 
because of this, the available papers find diverse results, with the effect of non-state 
ownership being mostly positive but sometimes statistically insignificant and sometimes 
negative. 
Concentration of ownership is important, with majority private ownership having 
mostly positive effects on the level of TFP. The overall positive effect is again driven 
primarily by foreign owned firms. The effect of majority domestic private ownership 
tends to be positive but smaller in magnitude. Studies that distinguish between privatized 
SOEs and newly created private firms suggest that de novo firms are more productive 
than or at least as productive as SOEs privatized to domestic owners. The effect of 
employee (insider) ownership on the level of TFP is found to be mostly statistically 
insignificant or in one case actually positive. Estimates of the effects of privatization on 
TFP growth suggest that in CEE privatization had a positive effect on the rate of change 
of TFP in the early transition period and that the effect disappears in the later stage. 
The effect of ownership on profitability has been estimated mostly in CEE and 
shows a small positive or insignificant effect of privatization to domestic or foreign 
owners on profitability levels in the early as well late transformation periods, together 
with an insignificant effect of privatization to domestic and foreign owners on the rate of 
growth of profitability. The effect varies across types of ownership, and concentrated 
domestic private ownership, managerial ownership, and to a lesser extent foreign 
ownership tend to have a positive effect on profitability, while state keeping a golden 
share or concentration of worker ownership appear to be unrelated to profitability. The 
studies of private ownership on profit of firms in China vary considerably in terms of 
methodology sample size and findings, with most indicating a positive and usually 
significant effect. 
The effect of privatization on the level of firm revenues, capturing the effect of 
privatization on the scale of operation of the firm, is mostly strong and positive. In terms 
of revenue growth, we observe in CEE a high positive effect of privatization to foreign 
owners in the early period and a small effect in the later period, as well as an insignificant 
effect of privatization to domestic owners. Overall, the studies of CEE and CIS countries 
indicate that privatization tends to have a positive effect on the scale of operation, while 
  4studies of the effect of private ownership on the rate of change of scale of operations 
(from CEE, CIS and China) suggest that this effect is not statistically significant except in 
some well defined categories of ownership. 
Estimates of the effect of privatization on labor productivity (not controlling for 
the use of others inputs) are similar to the TFP results -- the effect of privatization is 
primarily positive or insignificant. As in the case of TFP, foreign ownership and 
concentrated ownership are found to have a positive or insignificant effect, while the 
effects of employee and management ownership are estimated to be mostly statistically 
insignificant. The corresponding studies of firms in China yield mostly insignificant 
estimates of the effects of private/non-state ownership on labor productivity. 
In terms of the effect of privatization on employment, the estimates indicate that there 
is a tendency for privatized firms, especially those with foreign owners, to increase or not 
to reduce employment relative to firms with state ownership. In general, employee 
ownership and control do not have a significant effect on employment, providing parallel 
evidence to the TFP studies that this form of ownership does not result in excess 
employment. 
  Studies of the effects of ownership on wages find that state ownership is 
associated with lower wages in some countries, such as Russia and former 
Czechoslovakia, but not in others, such as Poland. In Russia, where in the 1990s firms 
tended to owe wages to their workers, SOEs were more likely to exhibit wage arrears 
than firms with domestic and foreign private ownership, firms with mixed ownership and 
de novo firms.  
  Studies that have analyzed the effect of privatization on other dependent variables 
show that (a) privatization results in higher exports and greater efficiency, as measured 
by the cost of inputs relative to sales, Tobin’s Q, and soft budget constraints, and (b) 
privatization to foreign firms leads to more restructuring and sale of assets, greater 
likelihood of payment of dividends, and smaller likelihood of default on debt. These 
results exhibit a pattern that is in line with the above measures of performance.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the theoretical and 
institutional issues raised by privatization in transition economies. In section 3 we briefly 
examine the macroeconomic evidence about the impact of privatization before turning in 
  5section 4 to a survey of the enterprise-level economics literature about the impact of 
privatization on different indicators of company performance. We conclude our study in 
Section 5 with policy-oriented observations. 
 
2. Theoretical and Institutional Issues 
In the early 1990s privatization was widely considered one of the keystones of the entire 
transition process. The policy arguments were based on successful experience in 
developed economies (e.g., Matthew Bishop and John Kay, 1988; Aidan Vining and 
Anthony Boardman, 1992), as well as on evidence from developed and middle-income 
countries that suggested that privatization improves enterprise efficiency (see Megginson 
and Jeffrey Netter, 2001 for a survey). The so called Washington Consensus emphasized 
privatization and belief that private ownership together with market forces would ensure 
efficient economic performance. Combined with price liberalization, freedom from state 
control was seen as the way to bring prices into line with opportunity costs and to harden 
budget constraints (see Kornai, 1990). 
However, it was also often recognized that privatization on its own might not be 
sufficient and that systemic changes and policy reforms were a prerequisite for successful 
transition (Jan Svejnar, 1989; David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs, 1990; Olivier Blanchard, 
Rudiger Dornbusch, Paul Krugman, Richard Layard, and Lawrence Summers, 1991; 
Philippe Aghion and Blanchard, 1994). We briefly review the accompanying policy 
reforms and systemic changes as well as the variation in the effectiveness of their 
implementation in the first sub-section (2.1) below. 
The transfer of ownership rights was seen by most academics and policy makers as 
being crucial for the efficient allocation of resources and economic growth. As a result, 
much empirical work has been related to efficiency and in the second sub-section (2.2) 
below we therefore survey the efficiency-related arguments for privatization.
3 
The large scale of privatization spawned considerable variation in privatization 
methods. It was suggested at the time that “bad privatization methods”, for example so-
                                                 
3 From a political perspective, however, privatization was viewed as being necessary in transition 
economies, even if there were to be no efficiency improvements -- the reason for privatization was to 
eradicate the command economic system rooted in communist ideology (see Andrei Shleifer and Robert 
Vishny, 1994). 
  6called “mass privatization” in which ownership rights were widely dispersed, may lead to 
“bad ownership structures” and therefore reduce the potential gains from privatization. 
We evaluate this argument in the third sub-section (2.3). 
In the final sub-section (2.4), we consider factors likely to influence the selection of 
firms for privatization. The theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that firms were 
not chosen to participate in the privatization process at random. Hence empirical 
estimates that fail to take account of this phenomenon will be biased. The prevalence of 
selection bias leads us to apply stricter criteria than previous surveys with respect to 
econometric methods when we evaluate the findings from the empirical literature in the 
final section of the paper. 
 
2.1 Policies in Transition Economies  
Privatization in the transition economies occurred in the context of broader systemic 
change. In almost all these economies, but not China (see Lawrence Lau, Yingyi Qian, 
Gerard Roland, 2000), governments plunged ahead with what Svejnar (2002) calls Type I 
reforms, namely macro stabilization, price liberalization and dismantling of the 
institutions of the communist system. Most countries also opened up rapidly to 
international trade, thus inducing a more efficient allocation of resources based on world 
market prices, and quickly reduced direct subsidies to SOEs.  
Svejnar’s Type II reforms involved the development and enforcement of laws, 
regulations and institutions that would ensure a successful functioning of a market-
oriented economy. These reforms included privatization and the establishment and 
enforcement of a market-oriented legal system and accompanying institutions able to 
create well-defined property rights, permit the enforcement of contracts, and limit 
corruption.  
According to the EBRD’s Transition Indicators (EBRD, various years) progress in 
developing a market-supporting legal system was everywhere slow, although the pace 
was more rapid in CEE than CIS in limiting corruption and establishing a functioning 
legal framework and institutions. An important impetus for implementing legal and 
institutional reforms in most countries in Central Europe, the Balkans and the Baltic, has 
  7been the need to develop a system that conforms to that of the EU as a prerequisite for 
accession (Richard Baldwin, Joseph Francois, and Richard Portes, 1997). 
 
2.2 Privatization and Efficiency 
Historically SOEs were established to ensure political control of production, better 
provision of public goods, more effective ways of dealing with externalities, 
spearheading of economic development in the absence of “well functioning” markets, and 
guaranteeing full employment and equitable income distribution. The economic 
performance of many SOEs proved disappointing, however, and since the early 1980s 
privatization started to be advocated as a means of establishing clear property rights, 
providing economic incentives and stimulating superior economic performance of firms 
and economies at large (see John Vickers and George Yarrow, 1988, Bernardo Bortolloti 
and Domenico Siniscalio, 2004). One argument for privatization is that firms under 
central planning are inefficiently large and their divestitures, combined with privatization, 
constitute a desirable way to improve corporate performance (see Jan Hanousek, Evžen 
Kočenda and Svejnar, 2008).
4 Another argument for privatization stresses the fact that 
the objectives imposed by the state as owner in SOEs are not necessarily consistent with 
profit maximization (see Saul Estrin and Virginie Perotin, 1991). The politicization of 
enterprise decision-making may also open firms up to lobbying and unproductive rent 
seeking (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1997). 
Even if the state as owner seeks to maximize the profits of its firms, problems of 
corporate governance may still lead to inferior performance. Outside owners – whether 
private or state – do not have full information about corporate performance, so firm-
specific rents may be appropriated by the managers. However, private ownership may 
place more effective constraints on managers’ discretionary behavior, via high-powered 
incentives for managers (Randall Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) or through the 
operation of the market for corporate control (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997), though if 
ownership is dispersed, owners may face a free rider problem in which the individual 
returns to monitoring by each owner are less than the costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
                                                 
4 Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar (2008) find that divestitures increase the firm’s profitability but do not 
alter its scale of operations, while the effect of privatization depends on the resulting ownership structure. 
  8The weak monitoring of managers by the state and the absence of external constraints 
often enabled SOE managers to gain discretion and follow their own objectives (Estrin, 
2002). 
In much of continental Europe, greater emphasis has traditionally been placed on 
bank debt than equity, with governance exercised via board membership of the 
controlling owners. This approach has also developed in a number of transition 
economies. However, in many developing economies as well as in some developed 
countries, family and business group ownership remains predominant, and though the 
ownership structures are typically highly concentrated, this ownership form is argued to 
impair company performance relative to outsider ownership structures (Morck, Daniel 
Wolfenzon and Bernard Yeung, 2005). This is relevant for transition economies because, 
privatization, especially in the CIS, has led to the emergence of diversified business 
groups owned by individuals (“oligarchs”). This might explain differential performance 
between CEE and CIS, though preliminary evidence suggests that business groups may 
actually be more efficient that other privatized companies in Russia and Ukraine (see 
Guriev and Andrei Rachinsky, 2005; Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Yegor Grygorenko, 
2008).
5 
Firms in transition economies also suffered the incentive problems caused by the 
softness of budget constraints (see Kornai, 1990, Mathias Dewatripont, Eric Maskin and 
Roland, 2000; Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003), with poorly performing firms often 
being granted easier access to external investment funds than the better performing ones 
(Lubomír Lízal and Svejnar, 2002). This led analysts to stress that hardening of budget 
constraints should be a priority and could be achieved most effectively by breaking the 
link between firms and the state through privatization (Alan Bevan, Estrin and Mark 
Schaffer, 1999). Moreover, Roman Frydman, Cheryl Gray, Marek Hessel and Andrzej 
                                                 
5 A number of theoretical papers have addressed the problems raised by the need to induce SOE managers 
to accept privatization (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Francesco Cornelli and David Li, 1997), although in 
practice this turned out not to be a problem. The desire to generate widespread political support for 
privatization in the context of de facto managerial control of enterprises has also been considered. For 
example Bruno Biais and Enrico Perotti (2002) analyzed politically motivated privatization. They found 
that when median voters favor redistribution, strategic rationing and under-pricing will be needed to shift 
problematic preferences. John Bennett and James Maw (2003) and Bennett, Estrin, and Maw (2005) also 
consider under-pricing, and explain how setting a zero price for privatized firms may be a rational strategy, 
even for a revenue maximizing government, provided the state also retains some shares in the privatized 
entity. 
  9Rapaczynski (2000) have argued that the imposition of hard budget constraints on SOEs 
will not induce strategic restructuring because entrepreneurial incentives associated with 
outside investor will still be absent. This relates to the incomplete contracts ideas of 
Oliver Hart and John Moore (1988) that have been used to argue that state managers tend 
to make routine decisions whereas private owners would engage in non-routine decisions 
and stimulate entrepreneurship. In the presence of external shocks, privatized firms are 
hence thought to move more readily into new markets and product lines and hence be less 
likely to lay off workers than SOEs. This suggests that privatization might only be 
effective when control shifts to new owners, who are thereby able to change the 
managers. As we discuss below, delayed privatization can undermine the performance of 
the SOEs, since in this situation the incentives of managers become to seize assets or to 
tunnel them out, rather than to improve performance (see Johnson, Rafael LaPorta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000).
6 
Perhaps the main caveat to the efficiency arguments in support of private ownership 
concerns the welfare dilemmas when private firms provide public goods and/or have 
natural monopoly power (Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, 1993). If firms have 
monopoly power, privatization can be harmful even if productive efficiency of a firm 
increases, unless there are adequate regulatory controls or sufficiently rapid entry (see 
also Edward Glaeser and José Scheinkman, 1996). Monopoly power also creates a 
dilemma for the state as owner in a privatization process; firms that are privatized with 
monopoly power can be sold for higher prices than if the company is broken up to create 
a more competitive market structure. Similarly, if corporate governance provisions for 
private firms are lax, company assets may be stolen and misallocated. Monopoly power 
may hence explain a divergence between empirical results concerning profitability and 
sales on the one hand, and TFP on the other.
7 
                                                 
6 One can also consider the issue of corporate governance from the perspective of employee participation in 
management (see Derek Jones, 2004). 
7 Privatization also has important for the distribution of income and wealth. Early analysts favored 
privatization at reduced prices and open to the population as a whole on grounds of equity (Blanchard, et 
al., 1991) and models were developed to evaluate the political processes balancing distributive and 
efficiency issues (Biais and Perotti, 2002; Schleifer and Vishny, 1994). In practice, however, ownership 
structures have evolved to become more concentrated and the emergence of “oligarchic” business groups in 
the former CIS has probably also exacerbated income inequality. Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis (2003) 
surveyed the impact of privatization on distribution in developing economies and concluded that 
  10 
2.3 Extent and Methods of Privatization 
The fact that the state owned almost every industrial firm in socialist economies raised 
questions about how much privatization should be undertaken, by what methods and at 
what rate. In practice, most countries decided to privatize a large number of firms rather 
quickly (Estrin, 1994) and were therefore forced to innovate in privatization methods in 
order to address the unprecedented issues of scale and the political urgency for speed. 
Some authors have suggested that deficiencies in some of these the new methods of 
privatization, notably the widespread use of forms of “mass” privatization, whereby 
shares are distributed at nominal prices to the population at large, may explain the 
apparent initial deficiencies in the impact of the policy (e.g. Joseph Stiglitz, 2002). 
The arguments for fast privatization were that (a) price liberalization and other 
reforms would not provide sufficient incentives for SOEs to restructure and become 
competitive, (b) state would not be able to resist intervening in SOEs (Frydman and 
Rapaczynski, 1991; Maxim Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995) and (c) managers (and/or 
workers) would decapitalize firms in the absence of rapid clarification of property rights 
(Frydman, Edmund Phelps, Rapaczynski and Shleifer, 1993; Blanchard, Dornbusch, 
Krugman, Layard, and Summers, 1991). In contrast, Dewatripont and Roland (1992a,b) 
and Roland (1994) argued that gradual privatization was needed because the political 
backlash to rapid privatization of all firms would be unacceptable. In particular, 
Dewatripont and Roland’s (1992a,b) argument for gradualism was that it allowed the 
government to pursue a strategy that necessitated fewer workers/voters being 
immediately laid off and that it would reduce uncertainty. As we discuss below, however, 
empirical evidence shows that in most countries privatization did not bring about a 
reduction in employment. 
The use of mass privatization did spearhead a remarkable growth in the private sector 
(Table 1).
8 However, this achievement should not conceal concerns about quality of 
                                                                                                                                                 
privatization programs had worsened the distribution of asset ownership, more so in transitional economies 
than Latin America. 
8 A hidden outcome of the large-scale property transfers was the creation of lasting state control over assets 
in many privatized firms. The actual extent of privatization, especially in the early years of transformation, 
was therefore less than appears from the official statistics. See e.g., Hanousek and Kočenda (2008). 
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9 Mass privatization led to ownership structures that 
were initially highly dispersed because the entire adult population of the country, or all 
insiders to each firm, were allocated vouchers with which to purchase the shares of the 
company. Mass privatization was also argued to hinder the establishment of effective 
corporate governance, especially when long "agency chains" were created by the 
emergence of financial intermediaries holding privatization vouchers (John Coffee, 1996; 
Stiglitz, 2002). It probably also hindered the development of secondary capital markets 
and in many countries it also initially resulted in majority ownership by insiders (Estrin, 
2002). 
Whether as a consequence of institutional weakness and/or the methods of 
privatization, the EBRD Transition indicators show that capital markets in transition 
economies developed less quickly than other market economy structures such as 
liberalized price setting or openness to trade. Indeed, stock markets in transition 
economies during the 1990s were often characterized by insufficient regulation, 
institutional fragility and weak minority shareholder protection (EBRD 1998; John Bonin 
and Paul Wachtel, 2003). 
 
2.4 Selection of firms to be privatized 
Whatever the privatization methods used, it is likely that firms are not assigned for 
privatization at random. This has important implications for econometric work assessing 
the impact of privatization on company performance because it implies that studies that 
treat the allocation of firms for privatization as random or do not adequately control for 
the non-random selection may potentially overstate the positive effect of privatization on 
performance. D-M for instance indicate that 47 percent of pre-2003 studies that they 
survey do not control for this non-random selection. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
9 For example, though retained state shareholdings were small in some of the leading transition economies 
in CEE, the state continued to own significant shareholdings in others, especially in the CIS. Thus in a 1999 
survey of privatized firms, the EBRD found that in 20 of the 23 countries, the state had retained some 
shares in around 20% of privatized firms, with more than a 20 percent shareholding in around 12 percent of 
the firms. The state kept a share of more than 15 percent of privatized firms in eight countries and more 
than 30 percent in a further four (Bennett, Estrin and Maw, 2005). Retained state ownership has been a 
factor in recent Chinese privatizations (Lihui Tian and Estrin, 2008). Governments have also issued golden 
shares to retain influence over some of the privatized SOEs. 
  12Realizing this shortcoming, Nandini Gupta, John Ham and Svejnar (2008) analyze the 
problem that arises in the studies that ignore the fact that better or worse firms may be 
privatized first. They note that there may be several reasons why a government may 
choose to sequence the privatization of SOEs. First, the government may incur 
excessively high transaction and congestion costs if it tries to privatize all firms 
simultaneously. Second, by sequencing it may reveal information about the firms to 
investors (later buyers may observe the quality of the firms sold earlier) if there is 
uncertainty about the quality of the firms being privatized, or avoid political opposition to 
reforms (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). Finally it may want to sequence privatization 
so as to avoid unemployment (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; and Barbara Katz and Joel 
Owen, 1993). 
Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2008) consider five competing government objectives for 
privatization: i) maximizing Pareto efficiency through resource allocation; ii) maximizing 
public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; iii) minimizing political 
costs stemming from unemployment;
10 iv) maximizing efficiency through information 
gains and v) maximizing privatization revenues. They use firm-level data from the Czech 
Republic to test the competing theoretical predictions about the sequencing of 
privatization and find strong evidence that the firms the government privatized first  were 
more profitable, were firms in downstream industries, and in industries subject to greater 
demand uncertainty. Privatizing more profitable firms first is hence inconsistent with 
maximizing Pareto efficiency but it is consistent with the model of maximizing 
privatization revenues, maximizing public goodwill and minimizing the political cost of 
unemployment. However, the implication of the political cost model that employment 
growth in the firm’s industry should affect sequencing is not supported by the results. 
Gupta, Ham and Svejnar’s (2008) finding that firms in downstream industries and in 
industries with greater demand uncertainty were more likely to be privatized early 
suggests that the government placed emphasis on efficiency in the Glaeser and 
                                                 
10 Political configurations can influence the pace and timing of privatization, as was found by Bortolotti and 
Paolo Pinotti (2003) in their study of 21 OECD countries over the period 1977-2002. In particular, the 
authors found that political fragmentation gave several groups the opportunity to veto or otherwise block 
large-scale privatization, and hence delay or even halt the process. 




3. Privatization and Growth 
A number of theoretical models provided competing predictions about the effects of 
privatization on macro-economic performance and growth. In Thorvaldur Gylfason 
(1998), privatization is shown to increase national economic output in a two-sector full-
employment general-equilibrium model by enhancing efficiency as if a relative price 
distortion were being removed through price reform, trade liberalization, or stabilization. 
Nico Hansen (1997) uses a general equilibrium imperfect competition model to show that 
a broad distribution of ownership rights can have favorable influence on micro-economic 
efficiency. 
Several studies use aggregate data to assess the effect of privatization on economic 
performance. Using data from thirty five developing market economies Patrick Plane 
(1997) finds that privatization (through divestiture) has a significant positive effect on 
economic growth and that the effect is stronger when privatization takes place in industry 
or infrastructure rather than in other sectors. Daniel Berkowitz and David De Jong (2001) 
find that regions with more large-scale privatization exhibit greater formation of new 
(legally registered) enterprises, which in turn exhibits a strong positive correspondence 
with growth. Steven Barnett (2000) uses macroeconomic and privatization data from 18 
countries to find that privatization proceeds transferred to the budget tend to be saved and 
used to reduce domestic financing. His other main finding is that total privatization, as 
opposed to just the proceeds being transferred to the budget, is correlated with an 
improvement in macroeconomic performance as manifested by higher real GDP growth 
and lower unemployment. In a cross-country aggregate study, Clifford Zinnes, Yair Eilat, 
and Sachs (2001) use a panel data set from 25 transition countries to find that 
privatization does not by itself increase GDP growth, but they suggest that a positive 
                                                 
11 Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) examine sequencing strategies that would increase efficiency via 
informational gains. In their model private firms respond to demand and cost shocks, but this information is 
ignored by public firms. The Glaeser-Scheinkman model predicts that privatization should begin where 
demand or cost volatility is the greatest and where it maximizes the flow of information. Thus when 
demand uncertainty is greater than cost uncertainty, the authors argue that downstream firms should be 
privatized before upstream firms because downstream firms are better positioned to transmit information 
between the retail and upstream sectors. 
  14effect is present when privatization is accompanied by hard budget constraints and in-
depth institutional reforms. Bennett, Estrin and Giovanni Urga (2007) use a panel data 
model and GMM estimation methods for almost all the transition economies (26 
countries), controlling for country or time specific factors with fixed effects. They do not 
identify a significant relationship between private sector share and growth; hence their 
results do not indicate a direct relationship between privatization and growth. However, 
they do have results concerning methods of privatization in that they find countries which 
used mass privatization enjoyed significantly higher growth post-privatization relative to 
pre-privatization, compared with countries that used other privatization methods. Their 
study suggests that, the advantage of speed in privatization brought about by mass 
privatization may have yielded long-term benefits in terms of economic growth.
12 Using 
similar data, Fabian Gouret (2007) provides complementary evidence about the impact of 
privatization methods on growth. He also finds a positive effect from mass privatization 
but it is smaller than from the more gradual methods of privatization. The difference in 
the results of the two studies stems from differences in specification, not completely 
overlapping data sets and the use of different estimation methods. 
The macro studies hence suggest that privatization, especially when accompanied by 
complementary reforms, may have a positive effect on the level of aggregate output or 
economic growth, but the effect of speed, and the accompanying dispersed versus more 
concentrated ownership, on aggregate output and growth is unclear. 
 
4. The Effects of Privatization on the Performance of Firms 
Earlier surveys of firm-level studies examining the effects of privatization on firm 
performance range from ones that find a large variation of outcomes but no 
systematically significant effect of privatization on performance (Bevan, Estrin and 
Schaffer, 1999) to those cautiously concluding that privatization improves firm 
performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001), to ones that are fairly confident that 
privatization tends to improve performance (Mary Shirley and Patrick Walsh, 2001; and 
Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
                                                 
12 They argue that their result is due to an increase in ownership concentration following mass privatization 
that had strengthened control over firms. 
  15This variation in the interpretation of results is brought about in part by the fact that 
the early studies had access to different and often somewhat limited data on firm 
performance and ownership. For these reasons, many studies treat ownership as a 
relatively simple categorical concept and some are often unable to distinguish the exact 
extent of ownership by individual owners or even relatively homogeneous groups of 
owners. Equally important, the diversity of interpretations and findings is generated by 
three types of interrelated analytical problems that may be expected in early studies in the 
context of the rapidly changing transition economies. First, the early studies rely on short 
time periods with observations concentrated immediately before and after privatization. 
Second, the early studies (a) use small and often unrepresentative samples of firms, (b) 
are frequently unable to identify accurately ownership because privatization is still 
ongoing or because the frequent post-privatization changes of ownership are hard to 
detect, and (c) often combine panel data from different accounting systems. Third, as we 
have discussed above, many of the early studies have not been able to control adequately 
for the selection/endogeneity problem of ownership and their estimates of the effects of 
privatization may hence be biased. 
Since the studies are heterogeneous with respect to their methodologies, we classify 
all studies into those that (a) employ fixed effects or instrumental variables (IVs) to 
handle the selection/endogeneity problem inherent in privatization and (b) do not tackle 
this problem and use OLS. Our classification has an important reason behind it. First, one 
can make the assumption that unobservable ownership effects, including those stemming 
from selection of firms for privatization or acquisition of firms by foreign owners, are 
typically correlated with the explanatory variables and error term in the model and do not 
change over time. In this case the bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity can be 
removed by estimating the fixed effects model. The fixed effects model contains an 
individual specific constant that captures all time-invariant (observed as well as 
unobserved) characteristics. The second assumption concerns the situation in which 
unobservable ownership effects vary over time. In this case it is necessary to employ 
estimation using instrumental variables to account for the selection/endogeneity problem 
  16inherent in privatization.
13 The success of the IV estimation depends heavily on finding 
adequate instrumental variables that satisfy the exogeneity condition. As suitable 
instrumental variables are often difficult to obtain, the fixed effects estimation has been 
frequently used, especially in earlier studies. 
In our evaluation, we use only estimates from the set of studies that employ fixed 
effects or IVs because they  are less likely to suffer from selection bias. In the case of 
privatization, private (especially foreign) owners are naturally interested in acquiring 
firms that have (at least potentially) superior performance. Hence, studies that do not 
account for selection may erroneously attribute potentially superior performance of 
privatized firms to the new owners rather than to the inherently superior performance of 
firms selected for privatization. 
In view of these issues, we consider 14 privatization studies covered by D-M that 
handle the selection/endogeneity problem and we add 20 studies that have been published 
or circulated as working papers by December 2007. In Table 2 we list these 34 studies, 
together with information on their region and performance indicator.  
In assessing the effects of privatization, we focus on total factor productivity (TFP) 
and TFP growth (Figure 1a and 1b, respectively), profitability and growth in profitability 
(Figure 2a and 2b, respectively), and revenue level and growth in revenue (Figure 3a and 
3b, respectively). We also discuss the main findings of studies dealing with labor 
productivity, employment, wages, and other indicators of performance (not reported in 
figures or tables). In the figures, we report separately results from studies dealing with 
Central-East Europe (CEE), including the Baltics and Balkans, and studies dealing with 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which started the transition later and 
placed less emphasis on the development of a strong, market-oriented legal framework 
and institutions.
 14 
As could be expected, even within each category of performance (e.g., TFP), the 
various studies employ a variety of measures (e.g., revenues, sales, or value added). Since 
there are very few studies that use a homogenous measure of performance, we have 
                                                 
13 Alternatively, other suitable techniques such as difference in difference estimator and matching-type 
estimator can be employed, provided that adequate data are available. 
14 For a more detailed discussion of the results of these studies, see Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar 
(2007), which contains detailed tables listing region, time period, performance measure, types of 
ownership, and resulting effects separately for each available study from the CEE, CIS and China. 
  17decided not to perform a meta-analysis -- combining coefficients and associated standard 
errors from various studies to obtain a single efficient estimate of the effect of 
privatization on a given measure of performance. We have opted instead for a graphical 
presentation to synthesize results obtained from varying measures within a given 
category of performance. The graphical presentation in Figures 1-3 therefore serves as a 
proxy for a meta-analysis. As stated earlier, in Table 2 we list all the studies employed in 
the graphical analysis and indicate what performance measures they use. In the table we 
also denote whether a study deals with data from the CEE, CIS or both. 
In constructing Figures 1-3, we depart from earlier surveys by distinguishing 
between effects on the level of performance (capturing a one-shot permanent impact) and 
effects on growth (capturing effects on the rate of change in performance over time). In 
Figures 1-3 we depict results for levels in panels A and results for growth in panels B. 
When summarizing the results, we divide the studies estimating the effect on level of 
performance into those that report relatively large effects (defined as more than 15%), 
medium effects (5-15%), small effects (less than 5%), and results that are statistically 
insignificant at the 10% test level. In terms of rate of growth, we divide the studies into 
those that report relatively large effects (more than 5 %), medium effects (1-5 %), small 
effects (less than 1 %) and effects that are statistically insignificant at the 10% test level.  
  We present the results graphically in the form of white, black and half-black/half-
white circles. White circles denote effects of studies that cover the early-to-mid 1990’s 
when privatization was not yet completed (the exact timeframe varies across countries). 
Black circles indicate that the data come from the mid-to-late 1990’s onwards. Half-
black/half-white circles denote effects of studies that cover both the early and late 
transition period. As a general rule one circle represents result for one country. For this 
reason the number of circles exceeds the number of studies. The difference is due to the 
fact that some studies report results for more than one country or group or time period. 
Several results from one study are translated into several circles. There are also four 
studies that report the average effect across more than one country. These studies are not 
included in the figures but their effects are captured in the text.
15 
                                                 
15 This is case of Stijn Claessens and Djankov (1998, 2002), Wendy Carlin, Steven Fries, Shaffer and Paul 
Seabright (2001), and Simon Commander and Svejnar (2007). 
  18Since the effects of foreign and domestic private ownership are in important 
respects different, we present in separate columns estimated effects of privatization to 
foreign owners, domestic private owners, and private owners as whole (studies that do 
not separate private owners’ domestic v. foreign status). 
 
4.1 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
Productive efficiency, or total factor productivity, is of major interest since the 
communist economies collapsed in large part because they were increasingly unable to 
sustain innovation and technical progress. In particular, central planners were relatively 
capable of mobilizing labor and capital resources through compulsory full employment 
and high rates of investment, but they had hard time increasing the amount of output that 
SOEs generated from any given inputs. As a result, a major expectation during the 
transition has been that firms would increase their TFP. 
We have identified 17 studies that control for selection/endogeneity and analyze the 
impact of ownership on TFP or rate of change of TFP, using value added, total product or 
sales revenues as the dependent variable and either dummy variables or percent share 
ownership as measures of different types of ownership.
16  
As may be seen in Panel A of Figure 1, in CEE the overall effect of private relative to 
state ownership on the level of TFP is mostly positive during both periods. Moreover, 
studies that break private ownership into categories show that the overall private v. state 
ownership dichotomy subsumes different private ownership effects. The studies almost 
uniformly suggest that privatization to foreign owners greatly increases efficiency. This 
effect of foreign ownership is strong and robust across regions. The effect of domestic 
private ownership is by and large also found positive in the CEE region, but it is 
quantitatively much smaller than that of foreign ownership (the quantitative effects are 
not fully discernible in the figure). Moreover, this effect is greater in the later than earlier 
transition period. In CIS, privatization to foreign owners yields a positive or insignificant 
effect while privatization to domestic owners generates a negative or insignificant effect. 
Studies that do not distinguish the national origin of the private owner produce a positive 
effect on TFP levels. In most instances, the estimated economic effect is smaller in the 
                                                 
16 There are also five studies that estimate the TFP effect by OLS. 
  19CIS than CEE. Overall, the TFP effect of privatization to domestic owners is weaker than 
that to foreign owners, takes longer to take a hold, and in the CIS it has been outright 
negative or insignificant. 
For comparative purposes, we have also surveyed the ownership-related studies that 
have been carried out on data from China. Probably because large scale privatization is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in China, there have not yet been any studies of great 
econometric sophistication and this may explain the patchy results. A number of studies, 
including Jefferson and Rawski (1996), address TFP issues with firm level data but do 
not examine differences in TFP related to privatization or ownership. Studies that address 
these issues (e.g. Yifan Hu, Frank Song, and Junxi Zhang, 2004; Shahid Yusuf, Kaoru 
Nabeshima, and Dwight Perkins, 2006)) find diverse results, with the effect of non-state 
ownership being mostly positive and often statistically significant.
17 
Compared to the D-M survey that found the effect of private ownership to be positive 
in CEE but insignificant in CIS, we hence find a strong positive effect of foreign 
ownership in both the CEE and CIS regions, and a quantitatively smaller positive effect 
of domestic private ownership in CEE and in Ukraine (together with a negative effect in 
Russia and the rest of CIS). The reason for finding a stronger positive effect than D-M is 
in part because we are focusing on studies that take into account the problem of 
selection/endogeneity of ownership, whereas the earlier surveys did not place as much 
emphasis on this issue. Indeed, the unreported OLS studies, including those in China, 
generate much more diverse effects in terms of the estimated OLS coefficients. Another 
reason for our stronger and more uniform findings of positive effects of private 
ownership may be that more of our studies cover recent years and privatization may take 
several years to have an effect as strong owners take control and markets start to function. 
Finally, institutional development is a slow process and more recent data may pertain to a 
more developed legal and institutional setting in most of the transition economies. The 
variety of findings about the effects of non-state ownership in China may also be related 
to the fact that privatization on a relatively large scale is a more recent phenomenon in 
China. 
                                                 
17 For a more detailed discussion of the results of these studies, see Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar 
(2007). 
  20Several studies examine concentration of ownership and find that it plays an 
important part, with majority private ownership having mostly positive effects on TFP. 
The overall positive effect is again driven primarily by foreign owned firms. The effect of 
majority domestic private ownership tends to be positive as well, but it tends to be 
smaller in magnitude. As before, the effect is found to be positive in Ukraine but negative 
in Russia. Overall, we hence find qualified support for the hypothesis that concentrated 
private ownership tends to increase efficiency more than dispersed ownership. 
The existing privatization studies also provide information about the effect of 
employee (insider) ownership on efficiency. There has been a major debate about 
whether employee ownership and control are associated with lower or higher efficiency 
and excessive use of labor (labor hoarding).
18 We have found seven studies that examine 
the effect of employee ownership on TFP. Six estimates from both CEE and CIS 
countries are statistically insignificant and one (Estonia) shows a positive effect of 
employee ownership on TFP. These results are different from those of D-M who find the 
overall effect of employee ownership on performance to be insignificant in CEE and 
negative in CIS. One reason for this discrepancy may be the aforementioned limited 
overlap between our and D-M studies in this area. Moreover, D-M report that “the results 
for managers and workers show a considerable degree of sensitivity to how selection bias 
is handled”, while we focus on studies that handle the issue of selection. Finally, D-M 
recalculate some estimates (e.g., in their Table 1) for the sake of comparability across 
studies, while we present the effects as reported in the original studies. 
Two studies distinguish between privatized SOEs and newly created private firms. 
Klara Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Katherine Terrell (2005) use 1992-2000 firm-level data 
for almost all industrial firms in the Czech Republic and Russia and find that foreign 
start-ups are less efficient than existing foreign owned firms, but more efficient than 
domestic start-ups, which are in turn more efficient than existing domestic firms. This 
study hence suggests that new firms tend to be more efficient than firms privatized to 
domestic owners. Using 2002 and 2005 firm-level data from 26 transition economies, 
Commander and Svejnar (2007) find that domestic start up firms are less efficient than 
                                                 
18 In addition to our discussion above, see Manuel Hinds (1990), John Earle and Estrin (1996), and Josef 
Brada (1996). 
  21foreign owned firms but not significantly different from domestic privatized or state-
owned firms. The two studies hence suggest that de novo firms are more productive than 
or at least as productive as SOEs privatized to domestic owners. 
As may be seen from Panel B of Figure 1, effects of privatization on TFP growth 
have been estimated by country only in the CEE region. The results suggest that in CEE 
privatization had a positive effect on the rate of change of TFP in the early transition 
period and that the effect disappears in the later stage. The studies do not distinguish 
between domestic and foreign categories of private ownership. Commander and Svejnar 
(2007) have estimated the effect of privatization to domestic and foreign owners on TFP 
growth on a sample of 27 transition economies, thus combining CEE and CIS countries. 
Using data from 2002-2005, they find the two effects to be both statistically insignificant. 
It is hence possible that foreign owners brought about a sizable increase in efficiency in 
the period immediately after acquiring the local firms in the 1990s, but that later on the 
rate of change in efficiency has been on average similar in all the principal types of 
ownership of firms. 
 
4.2 Profitability 
Profitability is an important indicator of company performance, although in the transition 
economies, as in many other developing countries, profits may be underreported by firms 
to evade taxes, and may reflect market power as well as technical efficiency. 
In Figure 2 we summarize the effects of ownership on profitability from 10 
studies. Most studies pertain to CEE and show a small positive or insignificant effect of 
privatization to domestic or foreign owners on profitability levels in the early as well late 
transformation periods (Figure 2A). This is accompanied by insignificant effects of 
privatization to domestic and foreign owners on the rate of growth of profitability (Figure 
2B). 
A further analysis of this overall pattern indicates that the effect varies across types of 
ownership (bank, investment fund, individual, etc.), with the positive effects in the case 
of foreign owners being brought about by industrial (non-financial) companies as owners, 
while in the case of domestic owners it is usually some form of financial ownership that 
generates positive effects on profit. In this finer categorization, however, the effects vary 
  22across studies. Interestingly, using data from the Czech Republic, Andrew Weiss and 
Georgiy Nikitin (2002) find a positive effect of national (state) ownership on the rate of 
change of both operating profit per worker and operating profit per unit of capital, as well 
as a positive effect of municipal ownership on the rate of change of operating profit per 
worker. Using data of the publicly traded firms in the Czech Republic during 1993-1995, 
Hanousek and Kočenda (2003) in turn find a positive effect of foreign majority 
ownership on the rate of change in returns on assets. Finally, Hanousek, Kočenda, and 
Svejnar (2007) find positive effect of the subsequent ownership by banks on change in 
ROA but this effect is offset by negative effect of change in ownership. Foreign industrial 
owners exhibit positive effect of initial ownership on profit over sales, while effect of 
subsequent ownership by others foreign owners is negative. Overall, profitability is not 
significantly affected by the state keeping a golden share. 
Three studies that control for endogeneity/selection examine the effect of ownership 
concentration. In the Czech Republic, Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2007) find no 
effect of concentration that results from the initial large scale privatization, but they find 
a positive effect of majority ownership by domestic private owners as a result of 
ownership changes that took place after privatization. In terms of foreign ownership, the 
authors do not find any effect of high (majority) concentration among foreign owners, but 
do find that strong (blocking) minority (33-49%) foreign ownership has a positive effect 
on return on assets. Jeffrey Miller (2006) finds the effect of concentrated ownership on 
return on assets to be positive in Bulgaria, while Marko Simoneti and Alexandra Gregoric 
(2004) find concentrated management (but not employees) ownership to have a positive 
effect on profit/sales in Slovenia. Hence, concentrated domestic private ownership, 
managerial ownership, and to a lesser extent foreign ownership tend to have a positive 
effect on profitability, while state keeping a golden share or concentration of worker 
ownership appear to be unrelated to profitability. 
Studies of the effects of ownership on profit of firms in China vary considerably in 
terms of their methodology, sample size and findings, and as yet only one uses 
sophisticated econometric methods. Thus Gary Jefferson and Jian Su (2006) estimate the 
effect of private ownership on profit/sales to be positive but significant only at the 10% 
test level. Other studies include Xiao-Yuan Dong, Louis Putterman, and Bulent Unel 
  23(2006) who find the effect of state urban and private rural ownership to be positive, while 
that of state rural and private urban ownership to be negative. Several studies of China 
examine ownership concentration, with Ligang Song and Yang Yao (2004) finding with 
that state and private majority ownership has a positive effect relative to non-majority 
state and private ownership, with the latter not being significantly different from one 
another. Tian and Estrin (2008) in turn find that state having small shareholding has the 
largest positive value on corporate value, followed by high state shareholding, while 
intermediate state shareholding has the lowest effect. Finally, Qian Sun and Wilson Tong 
(2003) find that majority state or foreign ownership does not have a significant effect on 
the operating income/sales ratio. 
In CEE, CIS and China, the effect of private foreign and domestic ownership on 
profitability is hence found to be positive or statistically insignificant, with the 
significance depending on the particular type of ownership. Concentrated domestic 
private ownership, managerial ownership, and to a lesser extent foreign ownership 
generally tend to have a positive effect on profitability, while evidence from CEE also 
suggests that profitability is unaffected by whether or not the state keeps a golden share 
or workers wield a more concentrated ownership. 
 
4.3 Revenues 
In Figure 3 we report the privatization effects on revenues from 14 studies. Since these 
studies do not control for input use, they effectively measure the effect of privatization on 
the scale of operation of the firm. In most studies carried out in CEE there is a strong and 
positive effect of private ownership on the level of revenues (Figure 3A). The effect is 
detected in studies that cover either the more recent period or both the earlier and more 
recent periods. Studies that derive their estimates only from the early period generate 
small (less than 5%). The positive effect is found with respect to both domestic and 
foreign private ownership, with foreign ownership appearing to have greater positive 
effects. A similarly strong positive effect is found in a study covering privatization in the 
early period in CIS. However, two studies that cover the later transition period in the CIS 
find small positive and negative effects, respectively. The CIS studies do not distinguish 
between domestic and foreign ownership.  
  24In terms of revenue growth, we see in CEE a high positive effect of privatization 
to foreign owners in the early period and a small effect in the later period, and an 
insignificant effect of privatizing to domestic owners. The one study that covers CIS does 
not distinguish between domestic and foreign private ownership and suggests that the 
effect of privatization is statistically insignificant. The somewhat positive findings for 
foreign-owned firms may be brought about by their better access to foreign markets and 
possibly support from foreign headquarters.  
With respect to China, Jin Jia, Sun, and Tong, (2005) find the effect of ownership 
on the rate of change of real sales to be insignificant, while Sun and Tong (2003) estimate 
this effect to be negative for state majority ownership, insignificant for foreign majority 
ownership and positive for companies that are listed on the stock exchange. 
Overall, the studies of CEE and CIS countries indicate that privatization tends to 
have a positive effect on the scale of operation, while studies of the effect of private 
ownership on the rate of change of scale of operations (from CEE, CIS and China) 
suggest that this effect is not statistically significant except in some well defined 
categories of ownership. 
 
4.4 Labor Productivity 
Estimates of the effect of ownership on labor productivity (not controlling for the use of 
others inputs) are based on twenty four studies. The results of these studies have a less 
clear-cut interpretation since differences across types of firms could be due to different 
efficiency or simply to different non-labor (especially capital) factor intensity. For this 
reason we do not present these results graphically. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the 
findings of these studies are similar to the TFP results -- they suggest that the effect of 
private ownership is primarily positive or insignificant. Similarly, as in the case of TFP, 
foreign ownership and concentrated ownership are found to have a positive or 
insignificant effect, while the effects of employee and management ownership are 
estimated to be mostly statistically insignificant. Finally, newly established firms are 
found to have lower labor productivity than others in some studies but not in others, but 
this may be brought about by a scale effect. Government retention of a golden share (veto 
power over certain key decisions) appears to have an insignificant effect. 
  25The corresponding studies of firms in China yield mostly insignificant estimates 
of the effects of private/non-state ownership on labor productivity, with only one estimate 
being positive. Overall, the effects of all types of private ownership on labor productivity 
(not controlling for non-labor inputs) are hence found to be positive or insignificant in 
CEE and CIS, and mostly insignificant in China. 
 
4.5 Employment 
The effect of privatization on employment, like on revenues, is an indicator of the extent 
of restructuring brought about through privatization. As such, it provides an important 
empirical link to the theoretical models of transition. 
Seventeen studies have examined the effect of ownership on employment or rate of 
change of employment, with thirteen of them tackling the issue of endogeneity/selection. 
The estimates indicate that there is a tendency for privatized firms, especially those with 
foreign owners, to increase or not to reduce employment relative to firms with state 
ownership, ceteris paribus, where the control variables usually but not always include 
output (sales) and/or output and input prices. This positive or insignificant employment 
effect is very different from the negative employment effect found in the Mexican 
privatized firms by LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999).  
In general, employee ownership and control do not have a significant effect on 
employment, providing parallel evidence to the TFP studies that this form of ownership 
does not result in excess employment. 
Using a large 1980-90 sample of firms in China, Julia Lane, Harry Broadman, and 
Inderjit Singh (1998) find a negative effect of the state and collective ownership on both 
job creation and job destruction.  
The studies of employment hence find that privatization in the post-communist 
economies and China is not associated with a reduction in employment, a phenomenon 
that is assumed in many theoretical models and which was documented in some 
developing countries (e.g., Mexico). On the contrary, private owners tend to keep 
employment at higher levels than SOEs, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.6 Wages 
  26Five studies of the effects of ownership on wages find that state ownership is associated 
with lower wages in some countries, such as Russia and former Czechoslovakia, but not 
in others, such as Poland. Daniel Munich, Svejnar and Terrell’s (2005) study of the 
Czech Republic suggests that there is no significant difference in the rate of return on an 
additional year of education between state-owned, privatized and newly established 
private firms, but that private firms reward university education more than SOEs. 
In Russia, where in the 1990s firms tended to owe wages to their workers, SOEs were 
more likely to exhibit wage arrears than firms with domestic and foreign private 
ownership, firms with mixed ownership and de novo firms (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002; 
Hartmut Lehmann, Jonathan Wadsworth, and Alessandro Acquisti, 1999). Hence, during 
this period private ownership was associated with a greater adherence to labor contracts 
than state ownership. 
 
4.7 Other Indicators of Performance 
At least 35 studies have analyzed the effect of ownership on other dependent variables. 
The following patterns of private ownership effects seem to be broadly supported by the 
data: (a) private ownership tends to result in higher exports and greater efficiency, as 
measured by the cost of inputs relative to sales, Tobin’s Q, and soft budget constraints, 
(b) foreign firms tend to restructure and sell assets more than others (Djankov, 1999), are 
more likely to pay dividends (Jan Bena and Hanousek, 2008), and are less likely to 
default on debt (Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 2000). Despite the fact that the 
broad range of indicators used in the studies precludes a unified summary, the results 
exhibit a pattern that is in line shown by other indicators. 
 
5. Concluding Observations 
The transformation of the former communist countries from almost completely state-
owned to mostly privately-owned economies is one of the fundamental events in recent 
economic history. Given the relatively poor performance of the centrally planned 
economies before the transition, most academics and policy makers expected 
privatization to result in greatly improved economic performance. As it turned out, the 
post-communist countries went through a deep recession in the first three to eight years 
  27of the transition, a period that usually coincided with the launch of privatization. Yet, 
they have been among the fastest growing economies since then -- in the last ten to 
fifteen years. In contrast, China did not lead its transition with large scale privatization 
and it avoided the transition recession observed in Central and East Europe (CEE) and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, it is relatively soon to draw 
strong conclusions from the Chinese experience with privatization, and there is a paucity 
of econometrically convincing studies at this stage. The evidence assembled in this study 
suggests that privatization and performance are related but that the relationship is more 
complicated than has been assumed. 
First, privatization to foreign owners is found to result in considerably improved 
performance of firms virtually everywhere in the transition economies – an effect that is 
best characterized as a fairly rapid shift in performance rather than a gradual 
improvement over an extended period of time. Second, the performance effect of 
privatization to domestic owners has on average been less impressive and it has varied 
across regions. The effect has been smaller, often delayed, but positive in CEE; it has 
been nil or even negative in Russia and the rest of the CIS. This divergence of findings 
between the CEE and CIS coincides with differences in policies and institutional 
development in the two regions, with the former increasingly adopting European Union 
(EU) rules and joining the EU, and the latter proceeding slower in introducing a market 
friendly legal and institutional system. Third, in China the results to date are less clear cut 
and relatively more estimates suggest that privatization to domestic owners improves the 
level of performance, perhaps because of the benefits of the gradual reform process. 
In-depth firm-level studies further suggest that concentrated (especially foreign) 
private ownership has a stronger positive effect on performance than dispersed ownership 
in CEE and CIS, but foreign joint ventures rather than wholly owned foreign firms have a 
positive effect on the level of total factor productivity in China. Worker ownership in 
CEE and CIS (collective ownership in China) does not seem to have a negative effect. 
Data from CEE and CIS suggest that new firms are equally or more efficient than firms 
privatized to domestic owners, and foreign start-ups appear to be more efficient than 
domestic ones. Interestingly, contrary to assumptions of many theoretical models, as well 
as evidence from some developing countries (e.g., Mexico), privatization in the post-
  28communist economies is not associated with a reduction in employment. On the contrary, 
private owners tend to keep employment at higher levels than state-owned firms, ceteris 
paribus. Finally, macro studies are consistent with micro analyses in that they suggest 
that privatization, especially when accompanied by complementary reforms, may have a 
positive effect on the level of aggregate output or economic growth. An important issue 
that remains unresolved is whether speed of privatization, and the accompanying 
dispersed versus more concentrated ownership, has a positive or negative effect on 
aggregate output and growth. 
In view of the above results, the question naturally arises as to why the effect of 
privatization in CEE and CIS has been smaller in the case of domestic than foreign 
private owners. Discussions with managers, policy makers and analysts suggest three 
leading explanations. The finding may reflect in part the limited skills and access to 
world markets on the part of the local managers. Domestically owned privatized firms are 
also the ones where performance-reducing activities such as looting, tunneling and 
defrauding of minority shareholders have been most frequent. Finally, in a number of 
countries the nature of the privatization process initially prevented large domestic private 
owners from obtaining 100% ownership stakes and insiders or the state often owned 
sizeable holdings (see Kočenda and Hanousek, 2008). It frequently took these large 
shareholders several years to squeeze out minority shareholders and in the process the 
large shareholders sometimes artificially decreased the performance of their newly 
acquired firms in order to squeeze out the minority shareholders at low share prices. 
The results highlight the importance of good management and corporate governance, 
access to world markets, and the presence of a functioning legal and institutional 
framework. For the former state-owned firms, restructuring is most easily and effectively 
achieved by foreign ownership. Foreign firms routinely bring in capable expatriate 
managers and invest heavily in training local managers. They sell products through their 
global distributional networks, introduce a relatively advanced system of corporate 
governance and stress the importance of business ethics. Corporate governance of foreign 
firms hence compensates to a considerable extent for the underdeveloped legal and 
institutional system in many transition economies. While some domestic firms have also 
developed good corporate governance, the underdeveloped legal system has allowed 
  29local managers (or block shareholders) in many privatized firms to maximize their own 
benefits at the expense of corporate performance and hence welfare of (other) 
shareholders as well as stakeholders such as workers and government treasury. This is 
likely to account for the limited positive performance effects of privatization to domestic 
private owners as compared to the performance of firms privatized to foreign investors. 
Interestingly, in China the constraints imposed by the government on foreign firms, 
together with a relatively functioning legal system, have diminished the difference 
between the performance of private domestic and foreign firms and made domestic-
foreign joint ventures the most productive form of corporate ownership. 
The most important policy implication of our survey is that privatization per se does 
not guarantee improved performance, at least not in the short- to medium-run. Type of 
private ownership, corporate governance, access to know-how and markets, and the legal 
and institutional system matter for firm restructuring and performance. Foreign 
ownership tends to have a positive effect on performance. The positive effect of 
privatization to domestic owners, to the extent that it exists, takes a number of years to 
materialize. 
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 Table 1: Private Sector Share of GDP 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Czech Republic  10 15 30 45 65 70 75 75 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Hungary  25 30 40 50 55 60 70 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Poland  30 40 45 50 55 60 60 65 65 65 70 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Slovak Republic  10 15 30 45 55 60 70 75 75 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Slovenia  15 20 30 40 45 50 55 60 60 60 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Estonia  10 10 25 40 55 65 70 70 70 75 75 75 80 80 80 80 80 
Latvia  10 10 25 30 40 55 60 60 65 65 65 65 70 70 70 70 70 
Lithuania  10 10 20 35 60 65 70 70 70 70 70 70 75 75 75 75 75 
Bulgaria  10 20 25 35 40 50 55 60 65 70 70 70 70 75 75 75 75 
Romania  15 25 25 35 40 45 55 60 60 60 60 65 65 65 70 70 70 
Russia  5  5  25 40 50 55 60 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 65 65 
Ukraine  10 10 10 15 40 45 50 55 55 55 60 60 65 65 65 65 65 
 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Transition Reports Table 2 
List of surveyed studies: territorial coverage and performance indicators 
 
Author(s) TFP  Profitability  Sales&Revenues  D-M 
Andreyeva (2003)  ×    ×   
Angelucci, Estrin, Konings, Zolkiewski (2002)   O   O   
Brown and Earle (2001a)  ×     YES 
Brown and Earle (2001b)  ×     YES 
Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006)  ⊗      
Carlin, Fries, Schaffer, Seabright (2001)     ⊗  YES 
Claessens and Djankov (1998)  O      
Claessens and Djankov (1999)   O    YES 
Claessens and Djankov (2002)     O   
Claessens, Djankov and Pohl (1997)   O    YES 
Commander and Svejnar (2007)  ⊗      
Djankov and Hoekman (2000)     O   
Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999)     O  YES 
Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000)     O  YES 
Grigorian (2000)     O  YES 
Grosfeld and Tressel (2002)  O      
Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar (2007)   O  O   
Hanousek and Kocenda (2003)   O     
Jones and Mygind (2002)     O  YES 
Jones, Klinedinst and Rock (1998)  O     YES 
Maurel (2001)     O   
Miller (2006)   O     
Orazem and Vodopivec (2004)  O      
Perevalov, Gimadii, and Dobrodey (2000)    ×  ×  YES 
Pivovarsky (2001)      ×   
Pivovarsky (2003)  ×      
Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005)  ⊗      
Salis (2006)  O   O   
Simoneti, Damijan, Rojec, and Majcen (2005)  O      
Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997)  O     YES 
Simoneti and Gregoric (2004)  O O     
Weiss and Nikitin (2002)  O O    YES 
Warzynski (2003)    ×    YES 
Zalduendo (2003)   O     
 
Note: O denotes coverage of the CEE countries; × denotes coverage of the Russia and CIS region; ⊗ 
denotes combination of the coverage for CEE, Russia and CIS. Yes in the D-M column indicates the study 
is covered by Djankov and Murell (2002). Figure 1.A. 
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Figure 1.B.  
TFP growth 
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Figure 2.A.  
Profitability level 
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Revenue level 
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